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Abstract
We explore a model of the interaction between banks and outside investors in which the ability of banks to issue inside
money (short-term liabilities believed to be convertible into currency at par) can generate a collapse in asset prices and
widespread bank insolvency. The banks and investors share a common belief about the future value of certain long-term
assets, but they have different objective functions; changes to this common belief result in portfolio adjustments and trade.
Positive belief shocks induce banks to buy risky assets from investors, and the banks finance those purchases by issuing new
short-term liabilities. Negative belief shocks induce banks to sell assets in order to reduce their chance of insolvency to a
tolerably low level, and they supply more assets at lower prices, which can result in multiple market-clearing prices. A
sufficiently severe negative shock causes the set of equilibrium prices to contract (in a manner given by a cusp catastrophe),
causing prices to plummet discontinuously and banks to become insolvent. Successive positive and negative shocks of
equal magnitude do not cancel; rather, a banking catastrophe can occur even if beliefs simply return to their initial state.
Capital requirements can prevent crises by curtailing the expansion of balance sheets when beliefs become more optimistic,
but they can also force larger price declines. Emergency asset price supports can be understood as attempts by a central
bank to coordinate expectations on an equilibrium with solvency.
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Introduction
Despite a large and rapidly growing theoretical literature, the
mechanisms that give rise to periodic asset price booms and crises
remain imperfectly understood. In this paper, we investigate one
such mechanism that arises from the interaction between banks
and outside investors, in which the capacity of banks to issue inside
money—short-term liabilities that are believed to be convertible
into currency at par—plays a central role. The model generates a
positive correlation between asset prices and bank leverage, which
is consistent with the empirical observation that banks, along with
other financial intermediaries, tend to finance more of their risky,
long-term assets with short-term debt when asset prices rise and
less when asset prices fall [1]. That is, bank leverage is procyclical,
in contrast with leverage among households and non-financial
firms, which is countercyclical. Because a static balance sheet has
countercyclical leverage (i.e., a rise in asset prices mechanically
lowers leverage, and vice versa), the procyclical leverage of
financial intermediaries suggests that they aggressively expand
their balance sheets and debt levels when asset prices are rising,
and that they contract balance sheets when asset prices are
declining.
This rapid expansion and contraction of banks’ balance sheets is
feasible because the short-term liabilities of banks are viewed by
non-banks as close substitutes for currency. The banking sector as
a whole can increase its net holdings of risky assets because non-
banks are willing to accept these liabilities in exchange for riskier
assets [2]. This observation—that the sizes of bank balance sheets
can be considerably elastic—is a key element in the model
explored here. Another important element is that the objective
functions of banks and outside investors differ: we assume that
banks operate in a manner that is risk neutral subject to an
insolvency constraint, while investors are risk averse. Both groups
share a common belief about the future value of certain long-term,
risky assets, and they interpret new information about the future
value of these assets in the same way. However, because their
objectives differ, changes to the common belief about the assets’
future value results in trade between the two groups.
For simplicity, we model banks and investors at the sectoral level
by considering one consolidated balance sheet for each group.
Initially, these two balance sheets are mutually consistent in the
sense that neither group wishes to adjust its portfolio at the
prevailing prices (given the commonly held belief about the future
value of the assets). Whenever this belief changes, trading restores
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consistency of the balance sheets. In the case of a positive shock to
the commonly held belief (representing greater optimism about the
future value of the assets), both groups demand more assets at the
current prices. Given that the asset supply is fixed in the short
term, a positive shock causes prices to rise and portfolios to be
adjusted. There exists a unique price at which balance sheet
consistency is restored, with assets sold by investors to banks and
new short-term liabilities (inside money) created. As a result, banks
expand their balance sheets and (typically) increase their leverage.
The response to a negative belief shock is not symmetric. After a
negative shock, both banks and investors wish to sell assets at the
prevailing prices, but there can be more than one price at which
balance sheet consistency is restored. This multiplicity of equilibria
results from the bank demand increasing in the asset price: lower
prices correspond to greater balance sheet stress and a greater
desire to sell. A sufficiently strong negative shock can eliminate two
of the equilibria, leaving only one equilibrium, at which the
banking sector is insolvent. (In the language of catastrophe theory
[3], the set of equilibrium prices undergoes a fold catastrophe as
the negative shock becomes more severe. More generally, varying
the hypothetical shock using two parameters (rather than one)
leads to a cusp catastrophe. A qualitatively similar effect arises in
models of stock market crashes induced by dynamic hedging [4].)
In short, the unwillingness of outside investors to absorb all the
assets that banks wish to sell can cause a discontinuous decline in
asset prices and widespread bank insolvency.
We show that successive positive and negative shocks of equal
magnitude do not cancel; rather, a banking catastrophe can occur
even if beliefs simply return to their initial state. In short, the
model is path dependent. A system that can absorb a negative
shock of a given size (without suffering a crisis) may be unable to
do so if the negative shock is preceded by a positive shock.
Optimism induces a buildup of leverage, which increases fragility
and can lead to insolvency if the optimism is subsequently
reversed.
Finally, within the context of this model we consider the effects
of policies such as emergency asset price supports and capital
requirements. Support of asset prices by the central bank can
coordinate beliefs on an equilibrium that is consistent with bank
solvency in the face of asset price declines. Such support was
accomplished by the Federal Reserve using a variety of temporary
facilities created in 2008; these facilities allowed for the lending of
reserves or Treasury securities to financial intermediaries in
exchange for much riskier and less liquid collateral. In contrast to
emergency policies that deal with an ongoing crisis, capital
requirements aim to prevent crises by constraining leverage
growth during asset price booms. This constraint can prevent asset
price collapses and widespread insolvency when optimism is
reversed; however, it can also induce greater selling in a declining
market, suggesting the need for graduated or countercyclical
constraints on leverage, as has been proposed by the Committee
on the Global Financial System [5], Goodhart [6], and Admati
and Hellwig [7].
Related literature
A substantial literature has examined the buildup of fragility in
the banking system during periods of low volatility. Long before
the most recent crisis, Minsky [8,9], Crockett [10], and Borio and
Lowe [11] argued that periods of stable growth result in changes in
financial practices that make subsequent instability more likely.
For instance, Crockett ([10] p. 5) argues that in contrast to the
conventional wisdom, ‘‘it may be more helpful to think of risk as
increasing during upswings, as financial imbalances build up, and
materializing in recessions.’’ Along similar lines, Minsky ([8] p.
126) writes: ‘‘Stability—even of an expansion—is destabilizing in
that more adventuresome financing of investment pays off to the
leaders, and others follow.’’
Inside money plays a central role in the theory of credit booms
and busts in Dang et al. [12] and Gorton and Ordon˜ez [13],
where emerging doubts about the collateral that backs privately
issued short-term debt can cause it to become ‘‘information-
sensitive’’, making investments in determining its quality profit-
able. Procyclical leverage has been shown to arise from standard
risk management strategies based on the concept of Value-at-Risk
(VaR), which amount to risk-neutral behavior subject to a
constraint on the likelihood of insolvency [14–16]. Leverage
cycles can also emerge in models of collateral equilibrium [17,18],
in which belief heterogeneity plays a central role; see, for instance,
[19] and [20]. In these models, an asset price boom is associated
with a distributional shift in wealth towards highly leveraged
optimists, with a corresponding reversal when prices collapse. See
also Lorenzoni [21] and Bianchi [22], who provide normative
analyses of credit booms and busts.
A closely related literature has studied the mechanisms by which
a financial crisis spreads. Distress can be transmitted through
knock-on contagion, in which the failure of one institution puts its
counterparties in a network at risk [23–30]. Even without any
direct counterparty relationships (e.g., without any loans between
banks), the failure of an institution can damage others through the
market impact of asset sales—an effect that can be especially
strong when institutions’ exposures to assets are highly correlated
[31–33]. Asset correlation, in turn, can arise through the imitation
of successful strategies, as in ecological models of financial crises
[34]. Contagion can also occur through an information channel,
such as when losses in one asset class or financial institution
generate worries about related assets and institutions [35–37].
Our contribution to this literature is to highlight the asymmetric
reaction of balance sheets to positive and negative shocks, the
possibility of discontinuous asset price declines, and the path
dependence of portfolio adjustments in response to changing
beliefs. We make a number of simplifying assumptions that block
the mechanisms that have already been extensively explored. First,
we assume that the banks and investors are homogeneous, so we
model them at the sectoral level as two consolidated balance
sheets. Second, we consider only a single class of risky assets, which
may be interpreted as securities backed by pools of other assets
such as mortgage loans, which in turn are backed by real assets
such as housing. Third, we assume that the supply of these assets is
fixed, effectively excluding the role of banks in underwriting new
assets, a potentially important source of systemic risk. Fourth, we
assume that the banks and investors share a common belief about
the probability distribution governing the bonds’ future value and
that they update their beliefs identically in response to new
information. Finally, we assume that the short-term liabilities of
banks are perceived to be risk-free at all times, so they never
become information-sensitive in the sense of Gorton [2]. This
assumption rules out the possibility of runs (such as those as in
Diamond and Dybvig [38]) and it allows us to focus on asymmetric
reactions to shocks, discontinuities in market clearing prices, and
the path dependence of portfolio adjustments.
The Model
Balance Sheets
Our model proceeds via a sequence of unitless time steps
t[f0,1, . . . ,T ,Tz1g. There is a single class of risky assets,
henceforth called bonds, available in fixed supply. At each step t,
let xt denote the number of bonds held by the banks, where each
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bond has unit par value (so each bond is worth at most 1 in period
Tz1). As described in the next section, the market-clearing bond
price in period t, denoted by pt, is determined by the commonly-
held belief at time t about the bonds’ future value. [For simplicity,
we assume that no interest payments are made prior to maturity
(i.e., these are zero-coupon bonds), so the bond price is bounded
above by its par value.] The total value of the banks’ bond
holdings is therefore ptxt. In addition to bonds, the banks’ assets
also include reserves rt, which include vault cash and deposits at
the central bank.
Bank liabilities consist of short-term debt that is believed by
investors to be convertible into currency at par without risk. We
refer to these liabilities as deposits, broadly interpreted to include
shares in money market funds, which carry an implicit if not
explicit government guarantee. These deposits yt are held by
outside investors. The banks’ equity at time t is the residual
et:ptxtzrt{yt. The banks’ consolidated balance sheet is shown
in Table 1.
The investors also hold a number of bonds (denoted by zt), as
well as money in the form of currency (denoted by ct) and bank
deposits yt. They carry no debt, so their equity wt is the sum of the
assets ptztzctzyt. We have in mind real money investors such as
pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, insurance companies and
retail mutual funds. All leverage therefore exists within the
banking system, and we ignore leveraged, non-bank investors such
as hedge funds.
For simplicity, we assume that a fixed fraction m of money in
circulation is held by investors as currency, so m:ct=(ctzyt) is a
parameter of the model, which we restrict to the interval ½0,1).
Provided mw0, the banks cannot expand their balance sheets
without limit because, as described below, they suffer a drain of
reserves as they accumulate bonds and because the total quantity
of high powered money (currency plus reserves) is in fixed supply,
under the control of the central bank. (Our arguments do not rely
on m being fixed, only that m be bounded away from zero at all
times, so that the expansion of bank balance sheets results in a
drain on reserves.) Table 2 shows the investors’ balance sheet.
Throughout this paper, we restrict attention to initial balance
sheets that are non-degenerate in the sense that both banks and
investors hold some bonds (x0,z0w0) and the banks are solvent
(e0§0).
Balance sheet consistency
Critical to our analysis is the concept of balance sheet
consistency, meaning a pair of portfolios and a price of bonds
such that banks and investors are both maximizing their respective
objective functions, given their shared belief about the bonds’
future value. Initially, the banks and investors have balance sheets
(i.e., Tables 1 and 2 at time t~0) that are consistent with respect
to a common belief about the bonds’ value. This shared belief
changes T many times via the arrival of unanticipated news that is
good or bad. At each time step t[f1,2, . . . ,Tg, the banks and
investors restore consistency of their balance sheets with respect to
the new belief at time t by trading, which results in a new pair of
portfolios. This trade also changes the bond price and the money
supply, defined as the sum of deposits and currency in circulation
(i.e., ytzct). Uncertainty regarding the bonds’ value becomes
resolved in period Tz1.
To define consistency formally, suppose that the banks were to
buy d units of bonds from the investors at the price p0. This
purchase would require the banks to transfer p0d units of money
to the investors by giving them mp0d units of currency (drawn from
the banks’ reserves) and by crediting the investors’ deposit
accounts by (1{m)p0d in the aggregate. (An investor who sells
bonds to one bank may deposit the proceeds in another bank, but
here we model these changes at the consolidated level of the
banking sector, ignoring identities of banks.) Table 3 shows the
resulting changes to balance sheets.
Note that if the banks were to purchase bonds (i.e., if dw0),
then the money supply (the sum of deposits and currency in
circulation) would rise. Conversely, if the banks were to sell bonds
(i.e., if dv0), then the money supply would contract.
At each period t[f0,1, . . . ,Tg, we assume that the banks and
investors share a common belief Vt about what each bond will be
worth when uncertainty is resolved in period Tz1. Each belief Vt
is a continuous random variable with density ft that has support
[0, 1] and expected value EVt.
The banks maximize their expected equity subject to the
constraint that their probability of insolvency (when uncertainty is
resolved) is smaller than E, a fixed parameter in (0,1). A popular
instantiation of this type of insolvency constraint is known as
‘‘Value-at-Risk’’ or VaR [15]. We note, however, that VaR plays a
dual role in the banking system: first, as a tool for risk assessment,
where it measures balance sheet strength by estimating the loss in
value such that losses greater than it occur with probability no
larger than a fixed, small number such as 1%; and second, as a
strategy for risk management (e.g., setting VaR equal to equity
limits the perceived likelihood of insolvency [5]). Here we invoke
VaR in this latter sense of risk management.
Meanwhile, the investors maximize their expected utility and
are risk averse, with preferences given by a strictly increasing,
strictly concave function of terminal wealth u : (0,?)?R.
Now we define balance sheet consistency.
Definition 1. The variables (pt,ct,rt,xt,zt,yt) are consistent
with respect to the common belief Vt if and only if





subject to P insolventð ÞƒE,
where finsolventg~fVt(xtzd)zrt{(ytzptd)v0g; and




Table 1. Consolidated bank balance sheet in period t.
Bank assets Bank liabilities
bonds ptxt deposits yt
reserves rt equity et
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.t001
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The constraints on d in Def. 1, as discussed below, simply ensure
that the banks and investors do not sell more bonds than they hold
nor buy more bonds than they can finance. The following
numerical example, to which we will refer throughout our analysis,
illustrates the idea of consistent balance sheets.
Example 1. The balance sheets in Table 4 are consistent with
respect to the belief V0*Beta(20,2) if E~1% (i.e., the banks ensure
that insolvency occurs with probability at most E~1%); the investors
hold m~10% of their money as currency; and the investors
maximize the utility function u(w)~w1{l=(1{l) with l~15 (i.e.,
investors’ preferences satisfy constant relative risk aversion). The
bond price is p0~$0:87 per unit of face value.
Next we examine how changes in beliefs affect balance sheets
and the market-clearing bond price.
Belief Shocks
Consider a financial system with a pair of consistent balance
sheets at time t[f0,1, . . . ,T{1g, and suppose that new informa-
tion about the bonds’ value emerges in period tz1 (e.g., news of
higher than expected foreclosures in the subprime mortgage
market). We assume that this information is public and interpreted
identically by the banks and by the investors. Nevertheless,
because the banks and investors have different objective functions,
the news may cause them to trade and hence reach a new market-
clearing price. We consider shocks to the belief Vt that shift
probabilities to higher values (positive shocks) or to lower values
(negative shocks).
Definition 2. Vtz1 is a positive shock to Vt (or equivalently Vt
is a negative shock to Vtz1) if and only if





Ft(x)dx for all x[½0,1, where Ft(x) is the
CDF of Vt], and
2. vtz1wvt, where vt is the first E-quantile of Vt [i.e., the inverse of
the CDF of Vt evaluated at E, i.e., F{1t (E)].
To determine the changes in the portfolios and the change in
the bond price that would restore consistency after a shock, we
express the investors’ demand for bonds Di(p) and the banks’
demand for bonds Db(p) in terms of a hypothetical price p[½0,1,
given the consistent balance sheets in period t. A market-clearing
price must make excess demand vanish in the aggregate, so the
new market-clearing price ptz1 is a root of the total demand
Dtotal(p):Di(p)zDb(p). The banks’ and investors’ demands at
this price determine their new portfolios.
Investor Demand
As in the definition of consistency (Definition 1), after the belief
Vt is replaced by Vtz1, the investors adjust portfolios to maximize
the expected value of their utility. Because the proportion of the
investors’ money in currency before and after the purchase of
bonds is m, the investors can buy d units of bonds using mpd dollars
in cash and (1{m)pd dollars from their deposit accounts.
Investors cannot borrow, so their total demand is upper-bounded
by their holdings of money (currency plus deposits). That is,
investors can demand at most dƒyt=½p(1{m)~ct=(pm) many
bonds. Also, the investors cannot sell more bonds than they hold,











where ftz1(:) is the probability density of Vtz1. Lemma S1 in File
S1 shows that, under mild assumptions satisfied here, the investors’
demand (1) is single-valued at all prices (and hence can be
expressed as a function).
Following Example 1, we consider the special case with investor
utility u(:) that satisfies constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and
Beta-distributed beliefs. That is, the investors’ utility function
u(w; l) :~w1{l=(1{l), where lw0 and l=1, and the beliefs of
bond values at time t[f0,1,2, . . . ,Tg are Vt*Beta(at,bt) for some
at,btw0.
Figure 1 illustrates that in this case the investor demand
function Di(p) is non-increasing with the price p, and there is
some price strictly below EVtz1 above which demand becomes
negative. Lemma S2 in File S1 shows that the investors’ demand
falls below ytz1=½p(1{m), the maximum number of bonds that
the investors can afford, precisely at the price
~ptz1:(atz1{l)=(atz1zbtz1{l).
Bank Demand
Recall that the banks maximize their expected equity subject to
an insolvency constraint. Consider a hypothetical price p[½0,1
after the shock that replaces the belief Vt by Vtz1. If this
hypothetical price p would render the banks insolvent (i.e., if
pxtzrt{ytv0), then the banks are forced to sell all their bonds,
so they demand Db(p) :~{xt. Otherwise, the banks remain
solvent, so they demand a number of bonds d that maximizes their
expected equity in period Tz1 using the new belief Vtz1,
Table 2. Consolidated investor balance sheet in period t.
Investor assets Investor liabilities




Table 3. Balance sheet changes following a purchase of d bonds by the banks at price p0 in period t = 0.
Bank assets Bank liabilities Investor assets
bonds zp0d deposits z(1{m)p0d bonds {p0d
reserves {mp0d currency zmp0d
deposits z(1{m)p0d
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.t003
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etz1~Vtz1(xtzd)zrt{(ytzpd), ð2Þ
subject to the three constraints
d§{xt (can sell at most all their bonds), ð3aÞ
dmpƒrt (can not have negative reserves), ð3bÞ
P etz1v0ð ÞƒE (insolvency constraint): ð3cÞ
Thus, the banks’ demand function is
Db(p; rt,xt,yt)~
arg max





Next we simplify the insolvency constraint (3c). Define vtz1 as
the first E-quantile of the belief Vtz1. That is, under belief Vtz1,
the probability that the terminal value of bonds will be at least vtz1
is 1{E. Because Vtz1 is continuous, the insolvency constraint (3c)
is equivalent to
vtz1(xtzd)zrt{(ytzpd)§0: ð5Þ
From (5), we see that the banks poise themselves at E-probability of





many bonds, provided that pwvtz1.
In Appendix S2 in File S1, we combine Eq. (6) with the
constraints (3a) and (3b); here we give the result. If vtz1wvt, as
occurs in a positive shock, then the numerator vtz1xtzrt{yt of
Eq. (6) is positive, so the banks satisfy their insolvency constraint (5)














as long as the banks are currently solvent (pxtzrt{yt§0) and the
price pƒEVtz1.
On the other hand, if vtz1vvt, as occurs in a negative shock,
then the numerator vtz1xtzrt{yt of Eq. (6) is negative, meaning
that the banks violate their insolvency constraint (5) immediately






as long as the banks are currently solvent (i.e., pxtzrt{yt§0)
and the price pƒEVtz1. Notice in Eq. (7) and in Fig. 2(B) that for
negative shocks the banks’ demand increases with the price p. In
contrast to typical demand functions, the banks sell more
aggressively at lower prices. This increasing demand function
results in a non-monotonicity of aggregate demand in the face of
negative shocks.
Aggregate Demand
In Fig. 3, we plot the total demand function
Dtotal(p):Db(p)zDi(p), the roots of which are the new
equilibrium prices. The plot ranges in the top and bottom rows
of Fig. 3 are identical. Notice that the banks’ demand in the case
of a negative shock (top-left plot of Fig. 3) is increasing in the bond
price, which can make the total demand (top-right plot of Fig. 3)
non-monotonic and hence have multiple roots (i.e., multiple
equilibrium prices ptz1). Next we show that at one of those
Table 4. Consistent balance sheets for the beliefs and preferences in Example 1.
Bank assets Bank liabilities Investor assets Investor liabilities
439 bonds at price $0:87 deposits $486 611 bonds at $0:87 equity $1072
reserves $168 equity $62 currency $54
deposits $486
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.t004
Figure 1. Illustrations of the investors’ demand function for
positive and negative shocks. Immediately after a positive shock
[panel (A)], the investors wish to buy bonds at the current price, but
they are willing to sell bonds if the price increases enough. Immediately
after a negative shock [panel (B)], the investors wish to sell bonds at the
current price, but they are willing to buy bonds if the price decreases
enough. In general, the investor demand function Di(p) [defined in Eq.
(1)] is non-increasing in the price p. By Lemma S1 in File S1, we know
that the investors demand Di(p)~{zt if and only if p§E Vtz1. Here,
investor preferences are represented by the CRRA utility function
u(w) :~w1{l=(1{l) for 0vl=1; for this case, we know by Lemma S2
in File S1 that the investors buy as much as they can afford,
Di(p)~yt=½p(1{m), if and only if pƒ~ptz1 .
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.g001
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multiple equilibria the banks are insolvent and that banking crises
can appear ‘‘out of the blue’’.
Results
Negative Shocks
Starting from a pair of consistent balance sheets, a small
negative shock to beliefs would lead to a slightly smaller bond
price. We illustrate that market-clearing price using a blue dot in
Fig. 4(A). A slightly stronger negative shock could create two new
equilibrium prices, marked by a red dot and by a black circle in
Fig. 4(B). Those two new prices appear in a saddle-node
bifurcation at the price (yt{rt)=xt. An even stronger negative
shock annihilates the two larger equilibrium prices in another
saddle-node bifurcation [Fig. 4(C)]. Stable and unstable roots of
Dtotal(p) are depicted by filled and empty circles, respectively, in
Fig. 4.
The price (yt{rt)=xt marks not only where two new
equilibrium prices appear but also whether the banks become
insolvent, because the banks are solvent at a hypothetical price p if
and only if pxtzrt{ytw0. The prices marked by red dots in
Figs. 4(B)–(C) and by the red line in Fig. 4(D) are equilibrium
prices that result in an insolvent banking sector [pv(yt{rt)=xt],
whereas the blue dots in Figs. 4(A)–(C) and the blue line in
Fig. 4(D) denote prices that maintain solvency.
Figures 4(A) and 4(B) demonstrate that a small shock can create
an equilibrium at which the banking sector is insolvent [i.e., create
the red dot in Fig. 4(B)] even if there continues to exist an
equilibrium price close to the original price and at which the banks
are solvent [i.e., the blue dot exists in Fig. 4(B)]. This multiplicity
of equilibria implies that a widespread fear of a crisis can become
self-fulfilling and result in a collapse of asset prices, despite the fact
that no crisis would occur in the absence of such fear. Actions by
the central bank in supporting asset prices and in containing fear
can effectively coordinate expectations on the more optimistic
equilibrium [the blue dot in Fig. 4(B)]. However, if the shock is
sufficiently large, as in Fig. 4(C), then coordinating expectations
alone cannot prevent crisis because there no longer exists an
equilibrium with a solvent banking sector.
In summary, negative shocks lead to a cusp catastrophe [3].
Specifically, there is a region of shocked beliefs (a1,b1), marked in
gray in Fig. 4(E), that give rise to three equilibrium prices.
Uniqueness of equilibrium is restored for beliefs above that gray
region, but this equilibrium is a very different kind because it
entails widespread bank insolvency. Next, we show that positive
shocks increase the risk of such a crisis.
Positive Shocks
Now suppose that beliefs about the terminal value of the bonds
becomes more optimistic because, for example, the prices of
underlying assets (e.g., housing prices) rise faster than expected.
This positive shock generates slack in the insolvency constraint
(3c), which allows the banks to undertake more risk by buying
bonds and by expanding their balance sheets. Because the
investors share the more optimistic beliefs, they also wish to buy
Figure 2. Illustrations of the banks’ demand function for
positive and negative shocks. Immediately after a positive shock
[panel (A)], the banks comply with their insolvency constraint (5) (i.e.,
vtz1xtzrt{ytw0); in this case, the banks want to buy bonds provided
that the price pƒE Vtz1 and provided that the banks are currently
solvent (pxtzrt{yt§0); the banks’ demand is given by Eq. (7a).
Immediately after a negative shock [panel (B)], the banks violate their
insolvency constraint (5) (i.e., vtz1xtzrt{ytv0); in this case, the banks
want to sell bonds, and the banks’ demand is given by Eq. (7b). The plot
ranges are identical in Figs. 1(A) and 2(A) and in Figs. 1(B) and 2(B); the
sums of these demands are shown in Fig. 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.g002
Figure 3. Illustrations of the total demand for a negative shock (top row) and for a positive shock (bottom row). The total demand is
the sum of the bank demand function Db(p) (left column) and the investor demand function Di(p) (middle column). Within each row, the plot ranges
are identical. The plots in the left and middle columns are identical to Figs. 1–2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.g003
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bonds at the price that prevailed before the arrival of the positive
shock. Thus, there is excess demand for bonds at the initial price,
so the price will accordingly rise. (Recall, our model assumes that
the total volume of bonds is fixed, thus ruling out the possibility
that banks can increase the size of their balance sheets by
underwriting new assets.)
The price will rise until the investors are enticed to sell bonds to
the banks. To see why, recall that after a positive shock the banks
Figure 4. Cusp catastrophe from a negative shock. The initial
condition is Example 1, in which the initial belief V0*Beta(a0,b0) with
(a0,b0)~(20,2). In panels (A)–(D), we consider negative shocks
V1*Beta(a1,b1) for progressively smaller a1, with b1 fixed at b0~2.
Panels (A)–(C) show the total demand function Dtotal(p), the roots of
which are the market-clearing prices p1 ; filled and empty circles in (A)–
(C) denote stable and unstable equilibria, respectively; the banks are
solvent at an equilibrium price p1 if and only if p1§(y0{r0)=x0 . The
following behaviors occur as a1 decreases: the negative shock becomes
more severe because the expected payoff from bonds decreases
according to EV1~a1=(a1zb1) [see the top axis of (D)]; the largest
equilibrium price [the right-most root p1 in (A)–(C), the maximum of the
curves in (D)] decreases, at first slowly and then precipitously when a1
passes the region of three equilibria [compare panels (B) and (C) and
notice the region of three equilibria near a1~16 in (D)]; after passing
the region of three equilibria, there exists only one equilibrium, at
which the banks are insolvent [red dot in (C), red curve in (D)]. The gray
region in (E) marks the belief (a1,b1) that gives rise to three equilibria [as
in (B)]; above that region, the price drops sharply, and the banks are
insolvent, i.e., p1x1zr1{y1v0 [see (C)].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.g004
Figure 5. Effect of a positive belief shock. A positive belief shock
induces the banks to buy bonds (A), to bid up the bond price (B), and
typically to increase their leverage (C). Here, we subject Example 1 to a
belief shock V1*Beta(a1,b1), for a1[(20,42:8 and b1~b0~2. The axis
EV1~a1=(a1zb1) is the severity of the positive shock.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.g005
Figure 6. Crisis from reversing a positive shock. A sufficiently
strong positive belief shock followed by an equally negative shock can
result in insolvency. Here, the initial condition is given by Example 1, in
which the initial belief V0*Beta(a0,b0) with (a0,b0)~(20,2), marked by
a black dot. At time t~1, a positive shock changes the belief to have
parameters b1~b0 and a1~20,26,32 (gray, green, and red circles,
respectively). The horizontal and vertical axes are the parameters (a2,b2)
of the new belief at time t~2. The three colored regions denote the
belief parameters (a2,b2) such that there exist three equilibrium prices
p2. The gray region is identical to that in Fig. 4(E). As in Fig. 4(E), above
the colored region, the banks are insolvent at the unique equilibrium
price. Note that the black dot lies above the red region, meaning that
restoring the initial beliefs after a large positive shock to a1~32 (red
circle) leads to insolvency.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.g006
Figure 7. A capital requirement can prevent insolvency when a
positive shock is followed by a negative shock. Here, we repeat
the experiments in Fig. 6 with a capital requirement of cmint :16%
(rather than cmint :0). The banks buy fewer bonds after the positive
shocks to a1~26 (green circle) and to a1~32 (red circle). Consequently,
when a second shock occurs, the regions of beliefs (a2,b2) that give rise
to three equilibria (i.e., the green and red regions) move to the right less
than they do when there is no capital requirement, so the system is less
vulnerable to insolvency if a negative shock subsequently occurs in
period 2. Unlike in Fig. 6, the black dot lies below the red region,
meaning that restoring the initial beliefs in period 2 after the large
positive shock in period 1 does not lead to insolvency.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.g007
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demand to buy bonds at all prices below the new expected value
E V1 [recall Fig. 2(A)]. The investors, meanwhile, demand to sell
bonds if and only if the price becomes large enough [recall from
Fig. 2(A) that their demand becomes negative just below E V1].
Thus, the new market-clearing price will be determined by the
investors selling bonds to the banks. The banks correspondingly
expand their balance sheets and increase the money supply as they
credit the investors’ deposit accounts.
As the positive shock becomes stronger (larger expected bond
value E V1), the banks buy more bonds [Fig. 5(A)] at an ever
higher price p1 [Fig. 5(B)]. Bank leverage (the ratio of assets to
equity) rises if the news is sufficiently positive [Fig. 5(C)]. Next, we
show that this procyclical leverage worsens the risk of bankruptcy
when beliefs subsequently become pessimistic.
Reversal of a Positive Shock
Consider a positive shock followed by a negative shock that
restores the initial belief. One might expect that such shocks of
equal magnitude ‘‘cancel’’ and leave the financial system
unchanged. However, this model is nonlinear, so portfolios
depend on the history of beliefs. Moreover, a sufficiently strong
positive shock [that results in greater bank leverage; see Fig. 5(C)]
that is followed by an equally strong negative shock can result in
insolvency.
Figure 6 illustrates such a crisis caused by optimism that is
reversed. The initial belief (a0,b0) is marked by a black dot. At step
1, the belief undergoes either a small positive shock, a large
positive shock, or no shock at all; the resulting belief parameters
(a1,b1) are marked in Fig. 6 by the green circle, red circle, and
gray circle, respectively. Next, consider in step 2 a second shock to
a belief V2*Beta(a2,b2). The colored regions in Fig. 6 are the
regions of beliefs (a2,b2) that give rise to three equilibrium prices
[just like Fig. 4(E)].
We focus in particular on what happens if the initial belief is
restored in period 2, i.e., if (a2,b2) equals (a0,b0), the black dot. In
this case, the initial and final beliefs are identical; we only vary the
intermediate belief in period 1. This intermediate state crucially
moves the region of multiple equilibria for period 2. For the small
positive shock (the green circle and green region in Fig. 6), the
initial belief (black dot) lies to the right of the green region; thus,
restoring the initial belief after the small positive shock does not
threaten the banks’ solvency. However, for the large positive shock
(the red circle and red region), the initial belief lies to the left of the
red region, so restoring the initial belief after the larger positive
Figure 8. When a positive belief shock occurs, a capital requirement can limit the banks’ bond purchases. Here, we show the bank
demand [panel (A)] and the total demand [panel (B)] for the case of a positive shock to Example 1 from a0~20 to a1~32 with a capital requirement
of cmint :16% (i.e., the positive shock in the red case in Fig. 7). The capital requirement binds for all prices shown in panel (A), so the bank demand
Db(p) (purple dashed line) equals the capital constraint Ccap: req:(p) (orange dot-dashed line). Because the banks’ demand is reduced in order to
satisfy the capital requirement [panel (A)], the total demand is reduced, as shown by the gray dashed line in panel (B). Consequently, the new
equilibrium price in the case of a capital requirement of cmint ~16% (labeled ptz1 in black) is smaller than the new equilibrium price without a capital
requirement (labeled ptz1 in pink). Thus, due to the capital requirement, the banks buy fewer bonds, and the bond price increases less, so the system
is less vulnerable to insolvency if negative shocks subsequently occur (Fig. 7).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.g008
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shock moves the financial system across the region of multiple
equilibria and into the region of certain insolvency. To reiterate,
reversing a large positive shock can precipitate widespread bank
insolvency. This behavior is consistent with a number of historical
episodes, including the global financial crisis of 2007–2009, in
which a rise and subsequent fall in real estate prices led to the near
collapse of the banking system.
Up to this point we have assumed that banks are unconstrained
by regulatory requirements. Next we consider the effects of capital
requirements.
Capital Requirements
A capital requirement aims to prevent insolvency crises by
requiring that banks maintain sufficient levels of capital (equity)
relative to their risk-weighted assets. In accordance with the
standards in Basel III, we assign risk weight zero to bank reserves
and risk weight one to the banks’ bond holdings. With this
assumption, the banks’ capital-to-assets ratio ct is the banks’ equity
et divided by the total, market-value of their bond holdings, ptxt.
Then the capital requirement mandates that this capital-to-assets










at each step t[f0,1, . . . ,Tg
Next we examine the effect of this constraint on the banks’
demand in the events of positive and negative shocks.
Capital Requirements and Bank Demand. If the banks
were to buy d bonds at a new price p in period tz1, then the
balance sheets would become those in Table 3, as discussed above.
The capital requirement (8) gives another constraint on the banks’
Figure 9. When a negative belief shock occurs, a capital requirement can force the banks to sell bonds more aggressively. This
pressure can be so strong that it causes a large price decline. Here, we illustrate the effect of a capital requirement on the banks’ demand function
Db(p) [panel (A)] and on the total demand function Dtotal(p) [panel (B)]. The thin lines in panels (A), (B) are the demand functions for the case of no
capital requirement (cmintz1~0), while the thick, dashed lines are the demand functions for a capital requirement of c
min
tz1~16%. Because of the capital
requirement (8), the banks’ demand cannot exceed Ccap: req:(p) [given by Eq. (10) and plotted as an orange dot-dashed line in panel (A)].
Consequently, the banks are forced to sell more bonds in order to satisfy the capital requirement if the price p is sufficiently small. Thus, in panel (B)
we see that implementing the capital requirement reduces the total demand Dtotal(p) over a certain range of prices p. In some cases, as in the case
shown in panel (B), the capital requirement can cause the equilibrium price to decline dramatically: compare the market-clearing price when there is
no capital requirement (the horizontal tick labeled ptz1 in pink) with the market-clearing price when there is a capital requirement of 16% (the
horizontal tick labeled ptz1 in black). Further note that this dramatic decline in the bond price causes the banking sector to be insolvent, because
ptz1 (for c
min
tz1~16%, marked in black) is smaller than (yt{rt)=xt . The numerical values in this example are a negative shock from a0~20 to a1~16,
with initial condition given by Example 1 (for which c0~16:4166%).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.g009
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In the event that this upper bound (9) on the banks’ demand d is
smaller than {xt, we define the capital constraint to be d~{xt
because the banks cannot sell more bonds than they hold. Thus,
the cap on bank demand due to the capital requirement, denoted








Augmenting the banks’ demand function (4) with the capital










If cmintz1~0, then the bank demand (11) reduces to the original one
in Eq. (4).
Next we show that capital requirements can act as a stabilizing
force in the event of positive shocks, but can also be destabilizing
when negative shocks occur.
Stabilizing Effects of Capital Requirements. As noted
above, a capital requirement effectively places a limit on banks’
bond purchases when a positive shock occurs. An obvious
consequence is that it also limits the corresponding growth in
banks’ leverage and hence their vulnerability to insolvency in the
event of a subsequent negative shock. To illustrate this behavior,
we repeat the experiments in Fig. 6 (i.e., a positive shock to
Example 1 followed by a negative shock), but this time we
implement a capital requirement with cmint ~16% at every step t.
(This capital requirement nearly binds in step 0 because the initial
capital-to-assets ratio in Example 1 is c0&16:4%, just barely
above the minimum of 16%.) Figure 7 shows the result. First, the
banks purchase fewer bonds in the positive shocks because of the
capital requirement. (Figure 8 shows how the capital requirement
affects the demand functions for the severe positive shock in
Fig. 7.) Because the banks buy fewer bonds in the positive shock,
the region of three equilibria does not move as much to the right as
they did without a capital requirement (compare the green and red
regions in Fig. 7 with those in Fig. 6), so the banks are less
vulnerable to insolvency in the event of a subsequent negative
shock. In fact, the red region now lies above the initial belief
parameters (a0,b0), which is marked by a black dot in Fig. 7.
Recall that, without a capital requirement, this large positive
shock led to an insolvency crisis if it was reverted (Fig. 6); by
contrast, with a capital requirement of cmint :16%, reverting this
large positive shock does not lead to an insolvency crisis. In other
words, our result is supportive of recent arguments for counter-
cyclical capital requirements [5], which maintain that capital
requirements be increased during boom periods and relaxed
during crises—a point that is further elaborated in the following
section.
Destabilizing Effects of Inflexible Capital
Requirements. Although capital requirements can help banks
avoid insolvency in the event of positive-negative shock combina-
tions, inflexible capital requirements can also be problematic. In
particular, for some negative shocks the capital requirement
specified in Eqn. (10) can eliminate the two large-price equilibria
(at which the banks would have remained solvent) by forcing the
banks to demand to sell even more bonds at those prices. With the
two large-price equilibria eliminated, only a small-price equilib-
rium remains, and the banks are insolvent at this equilibrium. In
other words, the capital requirement can force the bond price to
collapse and the banks to become insolvent.
Figure 9 shows an example of such a negative shock that
becomes a crisis if there is a capital requirement. Without a capital
requirement, there are three equilibrium prices because the total
demand function Dtotal(p) [the pink, thin line in the plot of the
bank demand in Fig. 9(B)] has three roots. Implementing a capital
requirement truncates the banks’ demand over the prices
½(yt{rt)=xt,vtz1=(1{cmintz1), as shown in Fig. 9(A). Consequently,
with a capital requirement, the two large-price equilibria have
disappeared, leaving only a small equilibrium price that entails
Figure 10. Capital requirements can cause bank insolvency in
the event of a negative shock. The region of shocked beliefs giving
rise to three equilibrium prices (marked by a color region) shrinks from
above when one implements a capital requirement. [Here, the initial
condition is Example 1, for which initial capital adequacy ratio c0 is
16:4166%, and we implement a capital requirement of c1 :~0 (gray
region) or c1 :~16% (yellow region).] This region of three equilibria
acts as a buffer against bank insolvency, so the capital requirement
reduces this buffer. To see this conclusion, consider a pair of belief
parameters (a1,b1) that lie in the gray region but not in the yellow
region; if there is a capital requirement, then the bond price declines
dramatically in period 1 and the banks become insolvent, but if there
were no capital requirement then no such crisis would occur. [Figure 9
shows the demand functions for one such example with
(a1,b1)~(16,2).]
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0104219.g010
Inside Money, Procyclical Leverage, and Banking Catastrophes
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 10 August 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 8 | e104219
bank insolvency [see the unique root of Dtotal(p) with no capital
requirement, given by the thick, dashed curve in Fig. 9(B)].
This event (that a capital requirement causes an insolvency
crisis) is rather generic: Fig. 10 shows that implementing a capital
requirement shrinks the region of beliefs giving rise to three
equilibrium prices. More specifically, a less severe negative shock
suffices to move the financial system above the region of three
equilibria and into the region of certain bank insolvency. The
region of three equilibria acts as a ‘‘buffer’’ against bank
insolvency, and the capital requirement shrinks that buffer. [For
details on why it shrinks the region of three equilibria from above
(and not from below), as illustrated in Fig. 10, see Appendix S3 in
File S1.]
These destabilizing effects substantiate recent arguments for
capital requirements that are graduated or flexible, as argued by
Admati and Hellwig ([7] p.189) and by Goodhart [6]. Basel III has
taken a step in this direction by implementing two requirements: if
a bank’s equity lies between 4:5% and 7% of its risk-weighted
assets, then the bank is required to slowly rebuild equity by
retaining profits and by avoiding paying dividends, but the bank
need not raise new equity immediately [7].
Conclusion
In focusing on inside money and procyclical leverage, our model
excludes several other potentially important sources of systemic
risk. For example, our assumption that the banks and investors are
homogeneous, and hence described by two consolidated balance
sheets, effectively rules out knock-on contagion. Asset-to-asset
contagion cannot occur because we consider only a single risky
asset. Market failure due to information asymmetry cannot occur
because of our assumption that the banks and investors share a
common belief about the asset’s value, and they update their
beliefs identically in response to new information. Finally, bank
runs cannot occur because we assume that the bank liabilities are
implicitly or explicitly guaranteed.
Although these simplifying assumptions make our model
unrealistic in many respects, they also highlight how little
complexity is needed to generate systemic risk; specifically, the
combination of inside money and procyclical leverage suffices to
generate crises. Moreover, the model provides a framework for
understanding the effects of policies such as leverage constraints
and emergency asset price supports. Many of the historically
unprecedented actions taken by the Federal Reserve in 2008
involved attempts to support asset prices that the central bank
could not directly purchase. By creating facilities that accepted
these assets as collateral in exchange for loans of reserves or
Treasury securities, the Fed may have been trying to coordinate
beliefs on more optimistic equilibria with a solvent banking sector.
This action was a response to crisis conditions that arose in part
because of excessive leverage, which countercyclical capital
requirements could have held in check. Our model demonstrates
the need for both types of policy in order to mitigate or prevent the
catastrophic consequences of a reversal of optimism.
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